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Abstract: 
Peer-to-peer (P2P) networking is currently an emerging 
technology that has gained dramatic increase in popularity 
both for network traffic and in the research domain. The 
growing popularity and use of P2P networks means that P2P 
has also attracted the attention of virus creators. A number of 
viruses have recently appeared that are especially designed 
to propagate through P2P networks. The purpose of this 
paper aims to provide a study on existing P2P simulators and 
selects an optimum simulator to implement a virus model 
that determines the spread of viruses via pure P2P networks. 
The defined model is a customized form of SEI 
(Susceptible-Exposed-Infected) model based on the study of 
epidemiology. The virtual behavior of fizzer virus is used in 
modeling virus propagation. Derivation of several 
differential equations is given that predicts the expected 
behavior of a P2P network. The derived equations are 
verified with the implementation of virus propagation model 
in a P2P simulator.   
Keywords: Virus Propagation, Peer-to-Peer, fizzer Virus, 
PeerThing. 
Introduction: 
Peer-to-peer (P2P) technology is not a new theory for 
computer networks industry. P2P technology is based on the 
phenomena to share computer resources and services by 
direct communication. The idea of direct communication has 
become the major source of popularity of P2P networks. P2P 
is currently used in wide variety of applications such as file 
sharing, games, instant messaging and content distribution. 
P2P networks are mainly used for sharing files containing 
data, audio and video in digital format [1]. There are several 
types of P2P networks that include Gnutella [2], Napster [3], 
Kazaa [4], BitTorrent [5] and many more. The growing 
popularity and use of P2P networks means that P2P has also 
attracted the attention of virus creators. P2P networks always 
have to deal with serious security issues, as they are prone to 
malicious codes such as viruses and worms. While P2P 
networks can be prone to variety of traditional viruses, there 
are many viruses that specifically target the performance of a 
P2P network. Some of those viruses and worms include 
Swen [4], Fizzer worm [4], LirvaA [4] and LirvaB [4]. 
Security concerns are always associated to any computer 
network irrespective of being a local network or a network 
connected to the Internet.  
Commercially used P2P networks consist of millions of 
users that are connected with millions of computer systems. 
In such a huge network, large number of file transfers takes 
place in a fraction of a second. In such conditions, a file 
containing a malicious code is likely to propagate to 
thousands of computer systems in no time. This leads to the 
need of a system that can predict the spread of viruses in 
P2P networks. The designed system must possess the 
capability of modeling different virus behaviors in different 
types of networks. Attempts have been made in the past for 
the development of systems that can be used to predict virus 
propagation, but most of the designed systems are based on 
numerical calculations and experiments. Nowadays, 
development of a system such as a computer network 
requires pre-testing being performed on a network simulator 
to make an assessment on the requirements and performance 
of that network. Similarly, a system developed in a P2P 
network simulator is required to analyze virus propagation in 
P2P networks. 
Security Threats in P2P networks: 
Viruses and worms are always major security threats to all 
kinds of computer networks, especially P2P networks. 
Worms are special type of viruses that have the capability of 
replicating itself and finding its way to spread around a 
network. A worm in a P2P network is generally an 
independent program that propagates throughout the 
network from one node to another. The main aim of a P2P 
worm is to affect the hosts in P2P networks. There are many 
viruses and worms that affect P2P networks below is a brief 
description of major known P2P viruses as stated in [4,5]. 
Swen: 
Swen [4] virus is one of the famous P2P viruses that mainly 
affect P2P networks such as Kazaa. Is also known as 
Win32.Swen.A@mm. Swen virus is considered as a very 
dangerous virus for the following reasons: 
1· Propagates through email, Instant Messaging (IM), 
Internet chat rooms. 
2· Propagates through P2P applications by making multiple 
copies of itself and placing them in the shared folder chosen 
from a list of filenames 
3· Generally comes in a hidden form of Microsoft Patch 
4· Mails itself to email addresses selected from the victim’s 
email address book and sent folders 
5· Introduces false errors in windows Messaging API 
(MAPI) and asks users for confidential information such as 
password, SMTP server, account, etc. 
6· Aliases: W32/Gibe@mm 
Fizzer Worm: 
Fizzer [4] worm is similar to Swen virus and is also one of 
the most popular viruses in P2P networks. It is also known 
as Win32.Fizzer.A@mm. The basic behaviour of fizzer 
includes the following: 
1· Propagates through email, Instant Messaging (IM), 
Internet chat rooms 
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copies of itself and placing them in the shared folder chosen 
from a list of filenames 
3· Contains backdoor and key logger abilities 
4· Backdoor component uses Mirc and AOL Instant 
Messenger (AIM) to allow the instigator of virus to issue 
commands on victim’s computer 
5· Keylogger stores data being input by the victim and hence 
allowing the virus author to view confidential data such as 
password, account details, etc 
6· Attempts to shutdown anti-virus programs 
7·Aliases:W32/Fizzer-A,I-Worm.Fizzer,W32.HLLW.Fizzer 
@  mm,W32/Fizzer@MM 
Lirva A and Lirva B: 
Lirva A and Lirva B [4] viruses mostly affect Kazaa P2P 
networks. These viruses are much dangerous as compared to 
the ones mentioned above. The main behaviour of this virus 
includes: 
1· Attempts to de-activate firewall and anti-virus 
applications. 
2· Scans Outlook address books and sent folders for 
addresses to mail itself on to 
3· Virus can be distributed through the following files:   
Resume.exe, Download.exe, MSO-Patch-0071.exe, MSO-
Patch-0035.exe, Two-Up-Secretly.exe, Transcripts.exe, 
Readme.exe, AvrilSmiles.exe, AvrilLavigne.exe, 
Complicated.exe, Singles.exe, Sophos.exe, 
Cogito_Ergo_Sum.exe, CERT-Vuln-Info.exe, Sk8erBoi.exe, 
IAmWiThYoU.exe. 
Magic Eightball: 
Magic Eightball [4] is known to be a trojan virus that infects 
P2P networks such as Kazaa. Magic Eightball comes in a 
packaged Zip file known as eightball2.zip. Its functionalities 
are as follows: 
1• Attempts to delete files on C: directory 
2• Once executed, trojan creates a batch file that contains 
instructions to delete files from the root directory 
3• Displays a series of dialogue boxes and when OK is 
pressed on the last dialogue box then the virus activates. 
Benjamin.A and Benjamin.B: 
The Benjamin [4] worms are a strong security threat to P2P 
networks. These worms are occasionally found to attack 
Kazaa networks without their authorization or awareness. 
The behavior of this virus includes: 
1· Display of fake error messages such as “Access error 
#03A:94574: Invalid pointer operation File possibly 
corrupted.” 
2· Once Worms then creates hundreds of copies of its files 
and places them in the shared folder of all the users in the 
network 
3· Worms also display the web site benjamin.xww.de. 
Lolol.a: 
Lolol [5] is another worm that spreads rapidly in a P2P 
network. This worm is similar to fizzer worm in behavior 
and has reported to infect many Kazaa file-sharing networks. 
Basic information about Lolol is as follows: 
1· Consists of a powerful backdoor routine 
2· Backdoor routine connects to IRC channel where it 
executes commands send by the author of the worm. 
3· Worm is a 60 KB Windows PE .exe file and written in 
Microsoft Visual C++ 
Related Work on P2P Virus Propagation: 
Study of virus propagation in P2P networks takes its 
initiation from a biological field of epidemiology. 
Epidemiology as defined in [6] is the study of how diseases 
spread in human population. There have been several papers 
[6, 7, 8, 9] published on virus propagation in P2P networks. 
In [6], how an infected file propagates through a P2P 
network is discussed. For the prediction of propagation they 
have used a modified version of a three state S-E-I 
(Susceptible-Exposed-Infected) model. The analysis is based 
on numerical calculations of the proposed model equations 
with some assumptions. Such analysis cannot be proved to 
be 100% correct unless performed on a P2P network 
simulator. The research paper in [8] is the modified version 
of the work mentioned in [6] by the same group of people. In 
this paper, the additional work includes the study of 
dissemination of polluted files and the release of P2P 
viruses.  
Extension in modeling includes the modeling of 
online/offline behavior of peers and the modeling of peers 
that remain infected. Data for the evaluation of this modified 
model is taken from a practical P2P network. The analysis is 
again made on the numerical calculations and also from 
simulation results but there isn’t any particular P2P 
simulator mentioned. The research paper in [9] presents the 
threats caused by P2P worms and possible mechanisms to 
avoid such threats. They formed a basic model in order to 
perform virus propagation and presented a theoretical 
analysis. The theoretical analyses are also supported by 
experiments performed on P2P graphs generated by a P2P 
simulator but the name of the simulator is not mentioned. 
They further developed an epidemic simulator that takes the 
P2P topology graph and the probability of node being a 
guardian node and generates the corresponding output 
representing the rate of change of infected nodes along time. 
There isn’t sufficient information about the functionalities 
provided by the epidemic simulator and the basis on which 
the output is generated. There is also lack of information on 
the performance of guardian nodes, if they themselves get 
infected. 
P2P Virus Propagation Model:  
The first step in analyzing the behavior of a virus requires a 
model. The objective of the defined model is to predict the 
expected spread of a virus via P2P networks and the changes 
it makes to the state of peers. Virus Propagation model 
described in [6] is used in this modeling technique with 
some amendments. 
Let’s assume a P2P network comprising of total number of 
N peers. Each peer in the P2P network can either be in one 
of the following three basic states:  
•  Vulnerable (V): Peers vulnerable to download a file 
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•  Exposed (E): Peers that have downloaded one or more 
infected files  
• Infected (I): Peers that have executed an infected file.  
An infected peer in the P2P network can be further classified 
as:  
• Peer State (PS): State of the infected peers in terms of 
online or offline  
When the above-mentioned variables are measured in terms 
of time t, then the following assumptions can be made:  
• V (t) represents number of vulnerable peers in time t  
• E (t) represents number of exposed peers in time t  
• I (t) represent number of infected peers in time t  
• PS (t) represents number of infected peers in online/offline 
states in time t  
Since the total number of peers in the P2P network is fixed 
at N, then for all values of t, N can be expressed by N = V (t) 
+ E (t) + I (t). The above-mentioned time-varying variables 
are affected by several individual events that include  
• A peer downloading a file from another peer,  
• A peer executing a shared file,  
• An infected peer changing its state and  
• An infected peer recovering,  
• ωV = Mean rate, in files per minute, at which each peer 
downloads new files.  
• ωE = Mean rate, in files per minute, at which each peer 
executes shared files.  
•  ωR = Mean rate, in recoveries per minute, at which 
infected peers recover. 
The mean rate at which these events occur are represented 
by the following parameters:  
 
P2P Simulators: 
Survey has been made on several existing P2P simulators. 
These simulators are specially designed for evaluating P2P 
network performances. The list of simulators that were 
surveyed includes: P2Psim, PeerSim, 3LS, Neurogrid, GPS, 
Query Cycle Simulator, RealPeer and PeerThing. In order to 
evaluate the performance of each simulator and choose the 
optimum to implement there is some evaluation criteria in 
which simulator’s architecture, usability, documentation, 
scalability, extensibility, statistics and traffic modelling has 
been measured. 
Comparison: 
The comparison between all the surveyed simulators. The 
assessment has been presented in way to analyze a simulator 
at a glance. The key aspects of each criterion stated are 
summarized. The summary highlights the main feature of 
each principle to facilitate a reader to grasp a bird’s eye view 
of each simulator. Table illustrates the summary of all 
simulators in terms of their evaluation performed on the 
criteria mentioned. 
 
Chosen Simulator: 
All the simulators mentioned in the above table consist of 
several pros and cons. Now a simulator has to be chosen in 
order to model virus propagation in P2P networks. The 
simulator that can be chosen to achieve our goal is 
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simulator. 
Simulator Architecture: 
Simulator architecture features of PeerThing simulator that 
made it preferable on other simulator architectures. The 
architecture is primarily based on the criterion to support 
discrete event simulations. The main components of the 
architecture are divided into two major categories: “system 
behaviour” and “system scenario”.  
The system behaviour allows defining the behaviour of each 
peer in a P2P network and scenario allows defining the 
environment of the P2P network. Additional behaviours can 
also be added and used by calling the behaviour with 
CallBehaviour attribute. The resource allocation for each 
peer is also defined in the scenario. After a network has been 
setup, its corresponding code is generated in XML for both 
system behaviour and system scenario. The architecture of 
PeerThing is well defined as compared to the architectures 
of rest of the surveyed simulators. 
Usability: 
PeerThing provides a GUI interface for its users to interact 
with the system. A user after modelling the system 
behaviour and scenario can run simulations in the simulation 
window. Simulation takes the system behaviour and scenario 
details as input and generates the output in a specified log 
file. PeerThing has the capability to run multiple simulations 
for a specified number of time steps or number of messages. 
The results for the number of messages generated and the 
nodes involved in the generation of those messages are 
shown by default on the results window. The generated 
results can also be converted to .csv format and opened in 
Microsoft Excel. 
Documentation: 
The user manual for PeerThing as compared to all the 
surveyed simulators can be considered as the best user 
manual. It has detailed information on how to use the 
simulator. It contains a step-by-step guide to build a basic 
network and view its corresponding results.  
The authors didn’t provide any API documentation with the 
simulator source code. The source code is not well 
commented and too complex to understand as there are 
many things interconnected with each other. But the user 
manual contains sufficient information for a user to model a 
basic network that lacked in all the surveyed simulators. 
Scalability: 
The authors have claimed that this simulator can simulate up 
to 2000 nodes for Gnutella network and 1000 nodes for 
Napster model. The simulator has been tested to support up 
to 700 nodes for Gnutella network with its proper 
functionalities. 
Extensibility: 
The extensibility of the simulator code is an extremely hard 
task to do as the source code is not well commented. But 
extensibility can be performed in the behaviour of the 
provided Gnutella and Napster basic models. The default 
Gnutella behaviour provided in the simulator only performs 
searching mechanism and does not provide any functionality 
for download operations if the searched file is found.  
Statistics: 
The results generated from the simulator are always stored in 
a log file before another simulation is performed. The results 
generated in form of tables and their corresponding graphs in 
the simulator visualization are limited to visualization 
provided by the simulator. Such results are not sufficient 
enough for analysis on subjects not supported by the 
simulator. But the capability of exporting files in .csv format 
allows a much detailed analysis to be done on the generated 
results. 
Traffic Modelling: 
Traffic modelling is basically the flow control of events and 
messages being performed in a network. PeerThing allows 
traffic modelling in the system behaviour of a network. 
Traffic can be modelled with the help of state of peers, the 
transitions a peer uses to go from one state to another and 
the tasks that it performs within a state. The capability of 
defining different traffic models allows the creation of 
networks with different behaviours. This feature is one of 
the most critical features that are supported by PeerThing 
and none of the other simulators proved to be a better option 
in this regard. 
Simulations: 
In this part of the paper implementation of virus propagation 
model in PeerThing simulator presents. Further presents a 
simulation performed on a basic Gnutella network in 
PeerThing simulator. Next, virus propagation model is 
implemented in Gnutella model then shows the results 
achieved from the simulator and finally analyses are 
presented on the achieved results. 
Gnutella Simulation: 
Gnutella type P2P network is a pure P2P network. Hence it 
is important to implement the virus model in a Gnutella 
network. But before the implementation of virus model, a 
proper implementation of Gnutella network is required.  
Experimental Setup: 
In this section, the experimental setup of Gnutella model in 
PeerThing simulator is presented. Let’s assume that the total 
number of peers in a Gnutella P2P network is N and the 
simulation runs for a time period T. TTL = 7 is used for the 
search requests i.e. a search request will pass through a 
maximum number of 7 hops and if the requested file is not 
found then the message would be dropped with a message 
“filenotfound”. Initially a peer is defined to have at least 2 
connections that can go to a maximum of 6 connections. As 
discussed earlier, Gnutella model consists of servents that 
act as both, as peers and servers. The behaviour of servents 
is defined in the system behaviour editor of the simulator. 
Illustrates the behaviour of a single peer in a Gnutella 
network. 
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Peer Behaviour in Gnutella Model 
Gnutella network developed in PeerThing makes use of 
states and transitions for defining the behaviour of peers. 
States are both source and destination of transitions. There 
are two distinct states in this Gnutella model namely primary 
state and connect state. The primary state is the starting state 
for all the nodes in the network. It selects a peer randomly 
from the available peers and stores them into a list. The 
selected peer becomes a host peer and a connection request 
is made to that peer from other peers.  The connect state 
represents the nodes that are in connected state and are ready 
to perform any requested service. Transitions specify the 
change between states. There are several transitions in a 
Gnutella model that include: connectRequest, connect, 
reconnect, connectOk, search, fileFound, searchRequest, 
downloadRequest and download. 
Working: 
This section provides the working behind the Gnutella 
model in PeerThing is discussed When the simulation 
begins, all the peers gets their status to online and starts 
making connection requests to randomly selected host peers 
in the network. Connections are established between the host 
peers and the requesting peers whenever a host peer 
successfully replies to the requesting peer. This corresponds 
to the ping and pong operations of Gnutella. The connected 
peers then become the neighbours of the host peers. After 
the connections have been established, next comes the 
search request for a desired file. A peer randomly selects a 
file from the list of resources in the network and places a 
search request for that file to its neighbouring peers. 
 This operation is similar to the query operation performed 
in a practical Gnutella network. The neighbouring peers after 
receiving the search requests then search for that file in the 
list of resources allocated to them; if the requested peer 
contains the desired file then it sends a message to the 
requesting peer that the requested file has been found. Along 
with the message that the file has been found, the 
identification of the node containing the file is sent to the 
query initiator. This corresponds to the QueryHit operation 
of Gnutella network. If the requested peer doesn’t contain 
the requested file then it forwards the search request to its 
neighbouring peers until the requested file has been found or 
all the connected neighbours have been searched for the file. 
Results and Analysis: 
Results of several sample simulations performed to analyze 
the basic behaviour of a Gnutella network. The simulations 
are performed to view the average number of downloads that 
takes place in a Gnutella network. In a practical network, as 
the number of nodes increase the average number of 
downloads is also expected to increase. The simulations 
were performed on different number of peers ranging from 
200 to 600 with different time steps. 
     
Average Downloads in Gnutella Network 
The above figure shows the results obtained from the 
simulator and plotted on Microsoft Excel. The obtained 
results shows that average downloading starts after 1000 ms. 
If the result at time stamp 2000 ms is observed then it shows 
that a network comprising of 200 and 300 peers downloads 
only a single file. But as the size of the network increases to 
400 peers then the download operations rises to 3. Similarly 
for 500 and 600 peers, the average number of downloads 
that takes place are 4 and 6 respectively. To summarise the 
acquired results, it can be said that as the size of a Gnutella 
type P2P network increases then the average number of 
downloads that takes place also increases. 
Gnutella Simulation with Virus Model: 
In this section, modification can be made to the basic 
Gnutella network to implement virus propagation in P2P 
networks on PeerThing. Next section describes the 
experimental setup of the virus model, and then explains the 
working mechanism of the virus model. Furthermore 
illustrates the results achieved from the simulations and their 
corresponding analyses are presented in last. 
Experimental Setup: 
The principal experiment setup of Gnutella network is the 
same for the virus model. There is an addition of several 
states and transitions to implement the virus model. The new 
states in this model are exposed, infected, peerOffline and 
the primary state are considered to be as the susceptible 
state. Below is the diagram that displays the model to 
implement virus propagation. The exposed state is used to 
represent the exposed peers.  
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susceptible (primary) state to exposed state through an 
exposed transition. The infected state represents the infected 
peers. When a peer executes the exposed file then it gets 
infected and goes to the infected state through infected 
transition. The peerOffline state is used to represent the 
peers that are no longer online. A peer goes offline whenever 
it is infected with a deadly virus that kills the processes of 
anti-virus programs. When such virus attacks a peer then it is 
virtually unusable and hence goes to peerOffline state. 
Figure displays the behaviour of a servent for modelling 
virus propagation 
 
 
Peer Behaviour in Gnutella Virus Propagation Model 
 
There are several additional transitions used in this model to 
implement virus propagation. The list of additional 
transitions is given below: 
  Exposed 
  Infected 
  Recovery 
  StillInfected 
  ChangePeerState 
  Recovered 
Working: 
Basic assumptions defined for Gnutella model described 
above are also applicable to this model. The main 
supposition for this model is that all the downloaded files are 
considered to have virus embedded in them. This means that 
whenever a peer downloads a file then it automatically goes 
from susceptible state to exposed state as the downloaded 
file already contains the virus. Virus modelling in PeerThing 
makes of the virtual behaviour of virus analyzed from the 
actual behaviour of virus. The working mechanism for this 
model starting from the connection setup till the download 
procedure is the same as the basic Gnutella model.  
As mentioned earlier the peer that performs download 
operation gets exposed. The exposed peer is supposed to 
have executed the downloaded file after certain time 
interval. When the file gets executed then the virus inside the 
file becomes active and starts to infect the peer. After 
infecting the peer that downloaded the file, the virus then 
looks for the neighbouring peers and infects all the 
connected peers. In the next step, the infected peer tries to 
recover itself from the virus by going through a recovery 
process. In case of generic virus when the recovery 
procedure is applied, the infected file is removed from the 
list of resources allocated to that peer and the peer gets 
recovered and comes back to vulnerable state.  
On the other hand, if a peer is infected with a fizzer virus 
then the recovery procedure fails to recover the infected peer 
and the peer remains infected as the fizzer virus has the 
capability to shuts down the processes of anti-virus 
programs. When a peer remains infected with a fizzer virus 
for a certain time period then it is considered to be in a state 
where it is virtually unusable. At this moment, the infected 
peer goes from the infected state to an offline state that 
means the peer is no longer active and disconnects itself 
from its neighbours. 
Simulator Limitations: 
PeerThing simulator similar to other simulators, along with 
several productive features also holds several limitations. 
First of all, the simulator is not highly scalable as when 
tested with more than 600 nodes, after roughly 3000 ms of 
simulation time, it starts to give java heap space error i.e. the 
simulator does not possess enough memory to run the 
complete simulation successfully. When tested with lower 
number of nodes such as 200 then the maximum simulation 
time achieved was 5000 ms. In order to achieve longer 
simulation time, simulations have to be performed in short 
span of time intervals. But even this technique does not last 
long as the simulator runs out of memory generate the java 
heap space error. Due to uncertain time periods of 
simulation run, multiple simulations have to be performed to 
achieve optimum results and also to verify that the obtained 
results are correct. 
Another limitation of PeerThing is that whenever an error is 
generated, a pop-up appears that states the error and also 
mentions that for more details view the console but there 
isn’t console associated with the simulator. The behaviours 
defined in the system scenario of PeerThing occasionally 
pretend as if they do not take part in the simulations at all. 
The user manual lacks details for the proper use of system 
scenario. The java heap space error can be handled with 
some extension made to the source code of the simulator. 
Since the simulator does not come with complete set of 
source code so it is not possible to extend the code for the 
simulator. Such limitations caused the most of the 
simulations to be performed for a limited time period of 
about 3000 ms. 
Conclusion: 
This paper illustrates a contribution to the study of virus 
propagation in P2P networks. As stated in the introduction, 
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enabled networks find it hard to guard themselves against 
the attack and spread of deadly malicious codes. The 
purpose of this paper was to model virus propagation in pure 
P2P networks using a P2P simulator. Different researchers 
have contributed in this field with models designed and 
implemented on numerical observations. But a lack of 
research material was found in the implementation of virus 
propagation model in an appropriate P2P simulator. The 
report started off with an overview of P2P systems in terms 
of its classifications, applications and major security threats.  
Next, a model was used to analyze virus propagation in P2P 
networks. After modelling virus propagation in P2P 
networks, a survey was presented on the existing P2P 
simulators. Virus model was then implemented on one of the 
surveyed simulator that proved to be the best among all the 
examined simulators. Finally, the expected results of virus 
propagation model were verified in the chosen simulator. 
This paper mainly provides an ideology to people 
responsible for network design and its security, so that they 
can test the level of their networks’ possibility for being 
prone to virus propagation prior to practical implementation. 
It is always better to define a strategy to cope with virus 
propagation beforehand rather than waiting for the threat to 
attack. 
Future Recommendations: 
The study of virus propagation in P2P networks is still in its 
early ages and requires a lot of research to be done in this 
domain. This paper may further be implemented with 
different probabilities assigned to a file being infected and 
an infected file being executed in virus propagation model. 
Other extensions to this paper can be the implementation of 
the virus propagation model in other popular P2P networks 
such as Napster, Kazaa, BitTorrent etc, in PeerThing 
simulator. The simulator used in this paper can also be 
extended to overcome the limitations for providing a better 
environment for the evaluation of P2P networks and model 
virus propagation. Implementation of virus model can be 
also performed in any other simulator that can implement the 
model with complete functionalities. 
References: 
[1] David Barkai (2000, February). An Introduction to Peer-
to-Peer Computing, Retrieved June 22, 2007, from Peer-to-
Peer Architecture Group, Microcomputer Research Lab, 
Intel Corporation, Project Web site: 
www.intel.com/technology/magazine/systems/it02012.pdf 
[2] Patrick Kirk (2003). Gnutella File Sharing And 
Distribution Network, Retrieved 
June 28, 2007, The Gnutella Homepage: http://rfc-
Gnutella.sourceforge.net/ 
[3] Napster (2007). Retrieved June 28, 2007, The Napster 
Homepage: http://www.Napster.com/ 
[4] Kazaa (2006). Retrieved June 28, 2007, from Sharman 
Networks, The Kazaa Homepage: http://www.Kazaa.com 
[5] BitTorrent (2006). Retrieved June 28, 2007, The 
BitTorrent Homepage: http://www.BitTorrent.org 
[6] Yi Lin (2004). Peer-to-Peer Systems, Retrieved July 15, 
2007, from McGill University, School of Computer Science 
http://www.cs.mcgill.ca/~cs577/lectures/577-p2p-slides.pdf 
[7] OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (2004, October). Peer-to-Peer Networks in 
OECD countries, Retrieved August 5, 2007 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/55/57/32927686.pdf 
[8] Miguel Castro, Manuel Costa and Antony Rowstron 
(2004). Peer-to-peer overlays: structured, unstructured, or 
both? Retrieved August 5, 2007, from Microsoft Research, 
Cambridge, UK Project Web site: 
research.microsoft.com/~antr/MS/Structella-tr.pdf 
[9] Choon Hoong Ding, Sarana Nutanong, and Rajkumar 
Buyya. Peer-to-Peer Networks for Content Sharing, 
Retrieved June 20, 2007, from Grid Computing and 
Distributed Systems Laboratory, Department of Computer 
Science and Software Engineering, The University of 
Melbourne, Australia 
http://www.gridbus.org/papers/P2PbasedContentSharing.pdf 
[10] Zupeng Li, Daoying Huang, inrang Liu, Jianhua Huang 
(2003). Research of Peer-to-Peer Network Architecture, 
Retrieved July 20, 2007, from National Digital Switching 
System Engineering & Technological R&D Center, Airforce 
Engineering University, China Project Web site: 
http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/iel5/8586/27215/01209091.pdf?tp=
&arnumber=1209091&isnumber=27215  
[11] Jian Liang, Keith W. Ross, Rakesh Kumar (2004, May). 
Understanding Kazaa, Retrieved June 20, 2007, from 
Polytechnic University, USA 
http://cis.poly.edu/~ross/papers/UnderstandingKazaa.pdf 
[12] Paul L. Piccard, Brian Baskin, Craig Edwards, George 
Spillman (2006). Securing IM and P2P Applications for the 
Enterprise. In Marcus H.Sachs (Technical Editor), Jaime 
Quigley, Chapter 11 BitTorrent, (pp 285 – 312), USA and 
Canada ISBN: 1597490172 
[13] Virus List (2007). Retrieved August 5, 2007, from All 
About Internet Security, Kaspersky Lab Project Web site: 
www.viruslist.com/en/viruses/encyclopedia 
[14] R.W. Thommes, M.J. Coates (2005). Modeling Virus 
Propagation in Peer-to- Peer Networks, Retrieved June 22, 
2007 from Department of Electrical and Computer 
Engineering, McGill University 
ieeexplore.ieee.org/iel5/11110/35625/01689197.pdf?tp=&is
number=&arn umber=1689197 
[15] Krishna Ramachandran, and Biplab Sikdar (2006). 
Modeling Malware Propagation in Gnutella Type Peer-to-
Peer Networks, Retrieved June 22, 2007, from Department 
of Electrical, Computer and Systems Engineering, 
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, USA 
http://networks.ecse.rpi.edu/~bsikdar/papers/ipdps06.pdf 
[16] Richard Thommes and Mark Coates. Epidemiological 
Modelling of Peer-to-Peer Viruses and Pollution, Retrieved 
June 22, 2007, Department of Electrical and Computer 
Engineering McGill University, Canada 
ieeexplore.ieee.org/iel5/4146652/4146653/04146754.pdf?tp
=&isnumber=&arnumber=4146754 
IJCSI International Journal of Computer Science Issues, Vol. 9, Issue 2, No 2, March 2012 
ISSN (Online): 1694-0814 
www.IJCSI.org 586
Copyright (c) 2012 International Journal of Computer Science Issues. All Rights Reserved.[17] Lidong Zhou, Lintao Zhang, Frank McSherry, Nicole 
Immorlica, Manuel Costa, and Steve Chien. A First Look at 
Peer-to-Peer Worms: Threats and Defenses, Retrieved June 
22, 2007, from Microsoft Research Cambridge and 
University of Cambridge 
research.microsoft.com/users/lidongz/p2pworm.pdf 
[18] Howrey Simon Arnold & White, LLP, Lisa Jose Fales, 
Esq.Charles Webb, Esq., The CapAnalysis Group, LLC 
James C. Miller III, Ph.D. Jeffrey A. Eisenach, Ph.D. Peer-
to-Peer Software Providers’ Liability Under Section 5 of the 
FTC Act, Retrieved July 5, 2007, from Washington, DC 
http://ipcentral.info/blog/P2P%20White%20Paper.doc 
[19]  Dan Sullivan (2005, April). Threats to Enterprise 
Security, Retrieved July 5, 2007, from Security Docs 
Project Web site: http://www.securitydocs.com/library/3211 
 [20] F-Secure (2007). F-Secure Virus Descriptions: Fizzer, 
Retrieved July 5, 2007 Project Web site:http://www.f-
secure.com/v-descs/fizzer.shtml  
[21] Stephen Naicken, Anirban Basu, Barnaby Livingston, 
Sethalat Rodhetbhai, Ian Wakeman (2006). Towards Yet 
Another Peer-to-Peer Simulator, Retrieved June 25, 2007, 
from Department of Informatics, University of Sussex, 
Brighton, U.K. www.comp.brad.ac.uk/het-
net/tutorials/P37.pdf 
[22] Stephen Naicken, Anirban Basu, Barnaby Livingston 
and Sethalat Rodhetbhai(2006). A Survey of Peer-to-Peer 
Network Simulators, Retrieved June 25, 2007, from 
Network Lab, Department of Informatics, University of 
Sussex, Brighton, U.K. www.xtremebytes.com/~abasu/d-
docs/paperpgnet2006_p2psimsurvey.pdf 
[23] S. Naicken B. Livingston A. Basu S. Rodhetbhai I. 
Wakeman D. Chalmers (2007, April). The State of Peer-to-
Peer Simulators and Simulations, Retrieved June 25, 2007, 
Department of Informatics, University of Sussex, U.K. 
informatics.sussex.ac.uk/research/groups/softsys/papers/ccr0
7.pdf 
[24] Nyik San Ting. A Generic Peer-to-Peer Network 
Simulator, Retrieved June 25, 2007, from Department of 
Computer Science, University of Saskatchewan 
http://bistrica.usask.ca/MADMUC/Pubs/ting880.pdf 
[25] Thomer M. Gil, Frans Kaashek, Jinyang Li, Robert 
Morris, Jeremy Stribling (2005). P2Psim: A Simulator for 
Peer-to-Peer (P2P) Protocols, Retrieved June 25, 2007 
Project Web Site: http://pdos.csail.mit.edu/p2psim 
[26] Chord (2006, December). Retrieved June 25, 2007 The 
Chord Homepage: http://pdos.csail.mit.edu/chord/ 
[27] Jinyang Li, Jeremy Stribling, Robert Morris, and M. 
Frans Kaashoek (2005). Bandwidth-efficient management of 
DHT routing tables, Retrieved June 25, 2007, from MIT 
Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory, 
http://pdos.csail.mit.edu/~jinyang/pub/nsdi05-accordion.pdf 
[28] Indranil Gupta, Ken Birman, Prakash Linga, Al 
Demers, Robbert van Renesse (2003). Kelips: Building an 
Efficient and Stable P2P DHT Through Increased Memory 
and Background Overhead, Retrieved June 25, 2007, Cornell 
University, Ithaca, NY, USA 
Project Web Site: http://iptps03.cs.berkeley.edu/final-
papers/kelips.pdf 
[29] Chimera (2006). Retrieved June 25, 2007 The Tapestry 
Homepage: http://current.cs.ucsb.edu/projects/chimera/ 
[30] Petar Maymounkov, David Mazieres (2002). Kademlia: 
A Peer-to-peer Information System Based on the XOR 
Metric, Retrieved June 25, 2007 
http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/529075.html 
[31] Mark Jelasity, Alberto Montresor, Gian Paolo Jesi, 
Spyros Voulgaris (2006, November). PeerSim: A Peer-to-
Peer Simulator, Retrieved June 25, 2007 Project Web Site: 
http://peersim.sourceforge.net/ 
 [33] Sam Joseph (2001, August). Neurogrid, Retrieved June 
25, 2007 Project Web Site: www.neurogrid.net/ 
[34] Weishuai Yang and Nael Abu-Ghazaleh. GPS: A 
General Peer-to-Peer Simulator and its Use for Modelling 
BitTorrent, Retrieved June 25, 2007, Department of 
Computer Science, Binghamton University Project Web 
Site: www.cs.binghamton.edu/~wyang/gps/mascots05.pdf 
[35] Tyson Condie, SepandarKamvar, Mario T. Schlosser, 
Beverly Yang. Stanford P2P Sociology Project, Retrieved 
June 25, 2007 Project Web Site: http://p2p.stanford.edu 
[36] Mario T. Schlosser, Tyson E. Condie, and Sepandar D. 
Kamvar. Simulating a File-Sharing P2P Network, Retrieved 
June 25, 2007, from Department of Computer Science, 
Stanford University, Stanford, USA 
http://www.stanford.edu/~sdkamvar/papers/simulator.pdf 
[37] Dieter Hildebrandt (2007, February). RealPeer - A 
Framework for the Simulation-based Development of Peer-
to-Peer Systems, Retrieved June 25, 2007 
Project Web Site: http://www.p2parch.de/ 
[38] Dieter Hildebrandt Dieter, Ludger Bischofs and 
Wilhelm Hasselbring (2007,February). RealPeer - A 
Framework for the Simulation-based Development of Peer-
to-Peer Systems, Retrieved June 25, 2007 
http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/iel5/4135239/4135240/04135315.p
df?tp=&arnumber=4135315&isnumber=4135240 
[39] Project Group "PeerThing" (2006, September). 
PeerThing, Retrieved July 5, 2007, from Software 
Engineering Group, Department of Computing Science 
University of Oldenburg, Uhlhornsweg, Germany 
Project Web Site: http://se.informatik.uni-
oldenburg.de/lehre/projectgroups/pgp2p/ 
 [40] Sepandar D. Kamvar, Mario T. Schlosser, and Hector 
GarciaMolina (2003, May). The EigenTrust Algorithm for 
Reputation Management in P2P Networks, Retrieved June 
25, 2007, from Stanford University Project Web Site: 
http://www.stanford.edu/~sdkamvar/papers/eigentrust.pdf 
 
Faheem: is currently working as System Engineer in a 
DUNYA news TV a leading News Channel in Pakistan. He 
has done BS in Computer Engineering from Sir Syed UET 
Karachi, Pakistan in 2006; Later on he has done his MS in 
Computer Science from The University of Lahore, Pakistan 
in 2012. He has more than 6 years of Practical Experience in 
different organizations.  
 
IJCSI International Journal of Computer Science Issues, Vol. 9, Issue 2, No 2, March 2012 
ISSN (Online): 1694-0814 
www.IJCSI.org 587
Copyright (c) 2012 International Journal of Computer Science Issues. All Rights Reserved.